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undefined and unknown emerging threat
be acceptable to the rest of the world?
Rockets’ Red Glare has my wholehearted
recommendation. However, it must now
be read with an active consideration of,
and sober reflection on, the impact of the
attacks of 11 September 2001 and their
aftermath, the war on terrorism.
CARL SCHLOEMANN

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William
Broad. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.
382pp. $27

In 1988, only two years before the Soviet
empire fell, secret scientific efforts were
still turning germs into weapons and creating entirely new germs. In Koltsovo, a
hidden Siberian city, scientist Nikolai
Ustinov died from an accident while
working with the Marburg virus, designed to bleed victims to death. With
clinical detachment, he documented his
own decline in a journal with bloodspotted pages. His colleagues found that
the virus had mutated while killing him.
Their response was consistent with their
careers—they buried the scientist in a
zinc-lined coffin and turned the “new”
virus into a weapon, naming it “Variant
U,” in tribute to Ustinov.
That story, with its multiple layers of
horror, shows why reality is often more
remarkable than the best novel. It also
has important parallels to current concerns over states that manufacture and
prepare living weapons for deployment.
Iraq again made the news when in March
2002 Iraqi civil engineer Adnan Sayeed,
along with another defector, smuggled
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out evidence of Iraq’s ongoing germ weapons program. Then there is Iran. This
book reprises the authors’ earlier reporting on wide-ranging, well-funded Iranian
efforts to buy up talent from destitute
Soviet weapons labs.
This is an important book on current affairs, crafted in an accessible style by
three professionals of the New York
Times who have excellent contacts in the
federal government. William Broad is a
science writer who has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. Stephen Engelberg has long
reported on national security issues. Judith Miller has done groundbreaking investigations on anti-American terrorists.
Although their report is not what might
have been done by a blue-ribbon scientific panel, it is reaching a much larger
audience. Moreover, it deserves favorable
notice as an original work created well
before the 2001 anthrax attacks.
Germs is not specifically about biological
threats posed by small terrorist groups; it
focuses on state producers of “super
germs”—disease-generating organisms to
be used in military weapons systems. It
discusses the tension between developing
biological weapons and devising programs to counter them. Any argument as
to whether a weapons program is for offense or defense (as Winston Churchill
showed in a humorous “disarmament fable” in October 1928) is more about intentions and regimes and fears than
about actual weapons. That leaves challenging ambiguities. Parts of this book
appear to be directed against any U.S.
government germ work that goes beyond
research and into development. Its wider
appeal is that all countries be kept within
bounds by treaty law.
Several small flaws are apparent. One
paragraph flatly dismisses the value of all
U.S. Senate hearings as mere stage
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productions. This idea is silly and elitist,
and is disproved by the authors themselves. In several other passages they discuss significant congressional work,
including a hearing by former senator
John Glenn, who chaired the Intergovernmental Affairs Committee.
There is no criticism of President Bill
Clinton in this book. The authors repeatedly show him in a good light as prodding the lethargic toward caring about
this new and very dangerous problem.
The authors do admit to lapses in his administration, but they attribute them to
others—for example, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who in a press conference hoisted a five-pound bag of sugar
to make a point about how anthrax could
kill half the District of Columbia. Some
think he exaggerated (and the authors
agree), yet when reporting the argument
Miller, Engelberg, and Broad treat Cohen
unfairly by mixing references to Washington, D.C., and its far larger metro
area. Also, just how much should one
care if Cohen’s five-pound bag of sugar
was light by two pounds, or ten, when
the next chapter states that the Soviets
were making 4,500 metric tons of anthrax every year?
The efforts by many U.S. officials and
scientists were important responses to a
reality well stated in this work: the U.S.
public health system must be better integrated into its national defenses—a need
recognized early on in Cold War civil defense. Although civil defense later declined, by 1989 the need, if not apparent,
was nonetheless great. Iraq was busy
brewing veritable swimming pools full of
anthrax, tularemia, glanders, bubonic
plague, as well as smaller amounts of
other agents. The Soviets’ formidable
biopreparat program would remain dangerous, even in decline, and even now
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Russia cannot be fully trusted on biowar
issues, say the authors.
Information on biological agent production came to light throughout the 1990s.
Weapons of mass destruction are now a
prime reason why the hottest topic in
Washington is “unfinished business”
with Baghdad. But with that challenge
comes another. Whatever the world community may do to stop Iraq’s weapon
development program, Iran will still
remain, wealthier than its neighbor and
equally ready to kill people, as proven by
three decades of transnational terrorism
and ongoing development of a range of
weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is still an odd blend of militarism,
weapons of mass destruction, and occasional fatuity. There must be a strategy
that deals with more than Saddam
Hussein alone.
CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON

Alexandria, Virginia
author of Terrorism Today

Duncan, Francis. Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press,
2001. 416pp. $37.50

Dr. Francis Duncan served as the official
historian to the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Energy and
worked in Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s
office from 1969 until Rickover’s retirement in 1982. Duncan also has had access to much of Rickover’s personal
correspondence, as well as that of his immediate family. Indeed, Rickover’s
widow wrote the foreword to this book.
This is Duncan’s third book on Rickover,
for whom he candidly admits great admiration. Although the author’s familiarity
with and admiration for his subject

2

